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ABSTRACT
Because of the long-term nature of the climate problem, technological advances are often seen as an
important component of any solution. However, when considering the potential for technology to
help solve the climate problem, two market failures exist which lead to underinvestment in climate-
friendly R&D: environmental externalities and the public goods nature of new knowledge. As a
result, government subsidies to climate-friendly R&D projects are often proposed as part of a policy
solution. Using the ENTICE model, I analyze the effectiveness of such subsidies, both with and
without other climate policies, such as a carbon tax. While R&D subsidies do lead to significant
increases in climate-friendly R&D, this R&D has little impact on the climate itself. Subsidies address
the problem of knowledge as a public good, but they do not address the environmental externality,
and thus offer no additional incentive to adopt new technologies. Moreover, high opportunity costs
to  R&D  limit  the  potential  role  that  subsidies  can  play.  While  R&D  subsidies  can  improve
efficiency, policies that directly affect the environmental externality have a much larger impact on
both atmospheric temperature and economic welfare.
David Popp






dcpopp@maxwell.syr.eduPoliticians often propose increased R&D spending as a solution to the climate change 
problem.  Such spending offers the political cover of doing “something” about climate change 
while avoiding more painful costs that may come from regulations requiring emissions 
reductions.  For example, in his 2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush 
proposed $1.2 billion of research funding to develop vehicles powered by fuel cells.  Can such 
policies impact the global climate?  Can R&D subsidies substitute for more restrictive emissions 
policies?  This paper addresses these questions. 
Because of the long-term nature of the climate change problem, technological change is 
often considered a part of any policy solution.  There is ample evidence that market forces such 
as higher prices or stringent environmental policies induce technological change.  For example, 
Popp (2002) documents dramatic increases in patenting for renewable energy technologies 
during the energy crisis of the 1970s. In recent years, economic models of climate policy have 
paid increasing attention to the links between policy and technological change.  Models that 
explicitly link technological progress to climate policy find that such links reduce the costs of a 
given policy, as policy levers serve to hasten the development of more climate-friendly 
technologies. 
Given the importance of policy-induced technological change, as well as a political 
climate that favors R&D subsidies over policies to limit emissions, it is useful to consider the 
role that research and development (R&D) policy, by itself, might play.  Such policies are of 
interest because, in the language of economists, markets for new knowledge are imperfect.   
Spillovers of knowledge make it difficult for inventors to reap the full social benefits of their 
innovations.  As such, the incentives provided by private markets for R&D investment lead to 
underinvenstment in R&D.  Policies addressing this, such as government-funded subsidies for R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  2 
R&D, R&D tax credits, or improved intellectual property rights to help inventors capture more 
of the returns to innovation, lead to greater levels of R&D spending, and presumably more 
innovation as a result.   
Recent work to consider the role of R&D policy as part of a climate policy portfolio 
includes Schneider and Goulder (1997), Kverndokk et al. (2004), and Fischer and Newell 
(2004).  Schneider and Goulder (1997) note that even if it is desirable to postpone the bulk of 
emissions abatement to the future (see, for example, Wigley et al. 1996), short-term policies that 
bring about low-cost emissions reductions are desirable.  One reason for this argument is that 
such policies spur innovation, making future emissions abatement less costly.  However, they 
also find that simply using R&D subsidies to achieve these cost reductions is not as effective.  
While R&D subsidies do correct market failures that pertain to knowledge markets, they do not 
address environmental market failures, and thus do not encourage adoption of any newly 
discovered climate-friendly technologies.  Kverndokk et al. (2004) extend this work by 
considering both an existing and potential new alternative energy technology.  R&D subsidies 
increase usage of the existing alternative energy technology, but as a result delay the introduction 
of the newer, and possibly better, technology.  Fischer and Newell (2004) compare R&D 
subsidies and other policies designed to reduce carbon emissions from the U.S. electricity sector.  
They rank R&D subsidies as the least effective for reducing emissions, but do not consider the 
effect of knowledge spillovers, and do not consider the use of multiple policies simultaneously. 
This paper builds on this work to study the role of both carbon taxes and R&D subsidies 
using the ENTICE model (Popp 2004a,b), an extension of the well-known DICE model of global 
warming (Nordhaus 1994, Nordhaus and Boyer 2000).  Like the DICE model, the ENTICE 
model is dynamic growth model linking economic activity and the environment.  Because it R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  3 
explicitly models the economic impact of climate damages, the model can be used to simulate 
optimal policy paths that balance both the costs and benefits of climate policy.  In this paper, I 
use the model to compare the effectiveness of R&D subsidies to policies such as a carbon tax 
designed to reduce emissions.  Because the ENTICE model calculates the costs and benefits of 
each policy, I am able to build on the existing literature by calculating optimal levels of R&D 
subsidies.  Like Schneider and Goulder, I show that these subsidies do enhance the effects of 
other policies, but have little impact on their own.  Furthermore, by examining the change in 
optimal policy paths with and without R&D subsidies, I show that most of the benefits of R&D 
subsidies come from cost savings, as there is little change in emissions under a carbon tax with 
or without subsidies in place.  Finally, when deciding on a level of government R&D spending, 
policymakers need to be aware of the opportunity costs of new R&D spending.  Because R&D is 
performed by highly-trained personnel, some new energy R&D will likely come at the cost of 
other types of productive R&D.  If policymakers ignore these costs, the overall macroeconomic 
effect of subsidies may even be negative. 
 
I. Theory: Market Failures Affecting Environmental R&D 
While market forces will lead firms to do some research on technologies designed to 
reduce carbon emissions, there are two reasons to expect markets to underinvest in such R&D.  
These market failures provide the motivation for government policy designed to increase such 
research.  One, of course, is the traditional problem of environmental externalities.  Because 
carbon emissions are not priced by the market, firms and consumers have no incentive to reduce R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  4 
emissions without policy intervention.  This reduces the market for technologies that reduce 
emissions, and thus reduces incentives to develop such technologies.
1 
The second market failure pertaining to R&D is the public goods nature of knowledge 
(see, for example, Geroski 1995).  In most cases, new technologies must be made available to the 
public for the inventor to reap the rewards of invention.  However, by making new inventions 
public, some (if not all) of the knowledge embodied in the invention becomes public knowledge.  
This public knowledge may lead to additional innovations, or even to copies of the current 
innovations.
2 These knowledge spillovers provide benefit to the public as a whole, but not to the 
innovator. As a result, private firms do not have incentives to provide the socially optimal level 
of research activity.   
Much economic research has been done quantifying the effect of such spillovers. 
Economists studying the returns to research consistently find that knowledge spillovers result in 
a wedge between private and social rates return to R&D.  Examples of such studies include 
Mansfield (1977, 1996), Pakes (1985), Jaffe (1986), Hall (1996), and Jones and Williams (1998).  
Typical results include marginal social rates of return between 30 and 50 percent.  In 
comparison, estimates of private marginal rates of return on investments range from 7 to 15 
percent (Bazelon and Smetters 1999, Jones and Williams 1998, Hall 1996).  Since firms make 
investment decisions based on their private returns, the wedge between private and social rates of 
return suggests socially beneficial research opportunities are being ignored by firms because they 
are unable to fully capture the rewards of such innovations. 
                                                 
1 Note that the externality market failure need not eliminate incentives to develop such technologies completely.  
The market failure problem means that individuals do not consider the social benefits of using technologies that 
reduce emissions.  However, such technologies may also come with private benefits – for example, reduced gasoline 
expenditures from switching to a hybrid-powered automobile. 
2 Intellectual property rights, such as patents, are designed to protect inventors from such copies. However, their 
effectiveness varies depending on the ease in which inventors may “invent around” the patent by making minor 
modifications to an invention.  See, for example, Levin et al. (1987). R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  5 
Because of knowledge spillovers, climate-friendly R&D will be underprovided by market 
forces even if policies to correct the environmental externalities of emissions, such as carbon 
taxes, are in place.  Popp (2004a) finds that the welfare gains from an optimal carbon tax 
increase by seven percent when the tax is supplemented with R&D subsidies sufficient to support 
all socially-efficient research.  This suggests two possible avenues through which policy can 
encourage the development of environmentally-friendly technologies: correcting the 
environmental externality and/or correcting knowledge market failures. 
Not surprisingly, economic theory dictates that the socially optimal policy is to address 
both market failures.  Moreover, Schneider and Goulder (1997) show that policies to address 
knowledge spillovers are more effective if they address all knowledge spillovers, rather than 
focusing on R&D pertaining to alternative energy.  Nonetheless, as targeted R&D subsidies are 
likely to be more politically popular than either broad-based R&D measures or restrictive 
emissions targets, it is useful to explore the potential of each mechanism both individually and in 
tandem. 
To address this question, I use the ENTICE-BR model of climate policy (Popp 2004b).  
ENTICE-BR extends the ENTICE model (Popp 2004a) to include policy-induced R&D on both 
energy efficiency and a carbon-free backstop energy technology source.  Both ENTICE models 
build on the well-known DICE model of climate change (Nordhaus 1994, Nordhaus and Boyer 
2000).  The DICE model is a dynamic growth model of the global economy that includes links 
between economic activity, carbon emissions, and the climate.  Because it includes both costs 
and benefits of climate change, it allows the modeler to simulate optimal paths for control of 
carbon emissions.  As such, unlike the analysis by Schneider and Goulder, I am able to calculate 
optimal policies for both carbon taxes and R&D subsidies.  Moreover, I examine how the R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  6 
optimal policy for each changes depending on whether the other market failure has also been 
addressed.  
 
II. The ENTICE Model 
To examine R&D policies to address climate change, one must use a climate policy 
model that that explicitly links climate policy and innovation.   Typically, these models include 
such links in one of two ways.  Bottom-up models include a detailed specification of energy 
systems, but typically do not include detailed modeling of the overall macroeconomy.  Such 
models usually implement induced technological change with a learning-by-doing framework, in 
which the costs of various technologies decrease with experience.  Examples include Gerlagh 
and van der Zwaan (2003), Manne and Richels (2002), Grübler and Messner (1998), and 
Messner (1997).  Because these models do not address the opportunity costs of any new research 
efforts, they tend to provide optimistic results concerning the potential of technological change.
3  
Top-down  models focus on the links between environmental policy and macroeconomic 
performance.  Endogenous technological change in these models typically comes through 
accumulated investment in research and development (R&D).  Recent models of this nature 
include Goulder and Schneider (1999), Nordhaus (2002), and Buonanno et al. (2003). However, 
of these models, only Goulder and Schneider include a choice of multiple energy technologies, 
including a carbon-free alternative. 
The ENTICE-BR model belongs to this second group of models.  It is a top-down model 
providing explicit links between economic activity and environmental damages.  The model uses 
the basic dynamic growth model framework of the DICE model (Nordhaus 1994, Nordhaus and 
Boyer 2000), but includes explicit links between climate policy and climate-friendly R&D.   
                                                 
3 See Popp (2004a, 2003) for a discussion. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  7 
Climate-friendly R&D can come in one of two forms: as R&D designed to improve overall 
energy efficiency, or R&D that helps reduce the cost of the carbon-free energy source.  The 
model is calibrated to a base year of 1995, and is solved in 10-year increments for a period of 
350 years.
4  Figure 1 illustrates the logic of the ENTICE-BR model.  Key equations pertaining to 
the energy research sector are presented below.  Interested readers are referred to Popp (2004a,b) 
for more detailed presentation of the model structure.  
In both the DICE and ENTICE models, the goal of the model is to maximize the present 
value of per capita utility, which increases along with increased per capita consumption, subject 
to various economic and environmental constraints.  One important difference between ENTICE 
and the original DICE model is that energy use must enter the production function explicitly, so 
that the potential benefits of energy saving research can be captured.  As illustrated in Figure 1, 
total energy services, which are defined below, are used along with capital and labor to produce 
output.  Defining output as Qt, labor as Lt, the physical capital stock, Kt, and effective energy 
units, Et, the production function used in ENTICE-BR is: 
(1)   t t B t t F t t t t t B p F p E L K A Q , ,
1 − − = − − β β γ γ  
Note that the cost of both energy sources are subtracted from final output, and that the price of 
both fossil fuels and the backstop, pF.t and pB,t respectively, vary over time.  The model is made 
dynamic by the various uses for output, which can satisfy current consumption needs, or be 
invested into the physical capital stock or as energy R&D.
5  Energy R&D either increases the 
level of energy efficiency technology or lowers the cost of the backstop technology.  The 
                                                 
4 Details of the calibration can be found in Popp (2004b) and in an appendix available from the author.  All results 
presented in this paper use the base case parameters from that paper, which assumes an initial backstop price of 
$1200 per carbon ton equivalent (equivalent to 7.1¢/kWh).  The effect of changing the calibrated parameter values 
in a model with R&D subsidies is similar to the effect of such changes in the model without R&D subsidies.  
Sensitivity analysis in the model without R&D subsidies may be found in Popp (2004b). 
5 As in the basic DICE model, other types of R&D are treated exogenously, and simply modeled as increases in the 
productivity of all inputs over time. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  8 
environmental component of the ENTICE-BR model links fossil fuel usage to increases in 
atmospheric temperature.  An associated damage function results in lower levels of output as 
temperature increases. 
As the main difference between the DICE model and ENTICE-BR is the energy research 
sector, I discuss those components of the model in greater detail.  Effective energy units, Et, uses 
a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) framework to aggregate the contributions of 
fossil fuels, the backstop energy source, and knowledge pertaining to energy efficiency.  The 
first nest, introduced in Popp (2004a), combines energy-efficiency knowledge and fuel 
consumption into the composite input of effective energy units.  The second nest, between fossil 
fuels and the backstop technology, is introduced in van der Zwaan et al. (2002).  This 
specification models the backstop and fossil fuels are imperfect substitutes, allowing for the 
possibility of “niche markets” for the backstop technology even when the price of the backstop 
exceeds fossil fuel prices.  In each nest, the ease of substitution is represented by ρi.  The case of 
perfect substitution is ρi = 1. The elasticity of substitution is 1/(1–ρi). Given this, effective 

















































Equation (2) states that the total energy requirements for production must be met either 
by the use of fossil fuel or by technological advances that substitute for fossil fuels.  Note that 
technology affects equation (2) in one of two ways. HE,t represents technological advances that 
replace fuels in production, and can thus be thought of as improvements to energy efficiency.  
This stock of knowledge responds endogenously to changes in policy, through an invention R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  9 
possibilities frontier that is described below.  αH is a scaling factor that determines the level of 
energy savings resulting from new knowledge.
6   
In addition, technology influences the level of the backstop technology chosen by 
lowering the cost of this input.  The backstop technology represents energy sources, such as wind 
or solar power, that are assumed abundant, and thus available at constant marginal cost.   
Currently, the high costs of these technologies limit their potential contribution to energy 
consumption.  However, we expect that technological advances will lower their costs over time.  
Defining HB,t as the stock of knowledge pertaining to the backstop, and using η to represent the 
relationship between new knowledge and prices, the backstop price at time t is:
7 
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The contribution of new energy R&D to the knowledge stocks HE,t and HB,t is determined 
by an invention possibilities frontier, which translates R&D into new contributions to 
knowledge.  Knowledge is cumulative, so that these contributions are added to the previous 
                                                 
6 Technology also enters exogenously through Φt, which represents exogenous changes in the ratio of carbon 
emissions per unit of carbon services.  Examples include changes in consumption patterns and switching to less 
carbon-intensive fossil fuels, such as natural gas.  The role of exogenous technological change is explored more 
fully in Popp (2004a). This remaining technological change is retained so that emissions in the baseline (no policy) 
simulation with R&D replicate the results of the DICE model without R&D.  The R&D modeled in the ENTICE 
models captures purposeful short-term efforts to improve energy efficiency or lower the costs of the backstop 
technology.  However, such R&D is not the only way in which carbon intensity falls over time. Because the DICE 
model and its variants are a one-sector macroeconomic growth model, changes in consumption patterns or 
substitution among types of fossil fuels are not explicitly modeled.  As a result, long-run emissions simulated 
without any exogenous decline in carbon-intensity are unrealistically high.  Fortunately, Popp (2004a) shows that 
the percentage of exogenous technological change remaining does not affect the net economic impact of induced 
technological change, as it is the level of R&D induced between an exogenous and endogenous R&D simulation that 
is important.  Changing the scaling factor only changes the level of emissions in each simulation, but not the 
difference between results in simulations with and without climate policy. 
7 Because differences in the costs of fossil fuels and the backstop technology will affect their relative usage, defining 
the costs of fossil fuels is also important.  Following Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), the price of carbon is the sum of 
the marginal cost of carbon extraction, and a markup that captures the difference between consumer prices and the 
marginal costs of extraction.  Defining CumCt as cumulative carbon extraction up to year t, and CumC* as the 
maximum possible extraction, the price of fossil fuels at any given time is PF,t = 276.29 + 700[CumCt/CumC*]
4.  
.  
 R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  10 
knowledge stock.  Defining Ri,t as R&D on research for each technology at time t, the knowledge 
stocks are given as 
(4)   () 1 , , , , 1 − ⋅ − + = t i H t i
b
t i t i H H aR H
i δ
φ ,     i = E,B 
I assume that both bi and φi  lie between 0 and 1. As discussed in Popp (2004a), φi  < 1 assumes 
there are diminishing returns to research across time.  Since energy R&D is specialized within a 
given field, it becomes more and more difficult to find new inventions as the knowledge frontier 
moves out.  Popp (2002) provides supporting evidence.  Similarly, b < 0 assumes diminishing 
returns to research at any given time. 
Finally, because of the public goods nature of knowledge, the role of market failures in 
R&D must be considered.  As noted earlier, virtually all empirical studies of R&D find that the 
social returns to R&D are greater than the private returns to R&D.  Since firms will invest until 
the private rates of return to R&D are equal to the rates of returns on other investments, 
underinvestment in R&D will occur.  I model these positive externalities by constraining the 
private rate of return for R&D to be four times that of investment in physical capital.  Removing 
this constraint assumes that government policies, such as R&D subsidies, are in place to correct 
market failures.   
In addition, since empirical work suggests that at least some energy R&D will come at 
the expense of other forms of R&D, we need to account for the opportunity cost of R&D.  Since 
the social rate of return on R&D is four times higher that of other investment, losing a dollar of 
other R&D has the same effect as losing four dollars of other investment.  This is modeled by 
subtracting four dollars of private investment from the physical capital stock for each dollar of 
R&D crowded out by energy R&D, so that the net capital stock is: 
(5)   Kt = {It – 4*crowdout*(RE,t + RB,t)}+(1-δ)Kt-1, R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  11 
where  crowdout represents the percentage of other R&D crowded out by energy R&D, It 
represents investment in physical capital, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital over time.
8   
 
III. Simulations 
Because the ENTICE-BR model includes environmental damages, it can be used to 
calculate an optimal climate policy in which marginal benefits equal marginal costs.  Such a 
policy meets a benefit-cost criterion of maximizing total net benefits, and is equivalent to using 
carbon taxes to correct the environmental externality described in section I.  In addition, 
removing the constraint that the rate of return of energy R&D be four times that of other 
investment is equivalent to using policy to correct market failures for R&D, such as government 
funded R&D that supplements private R&D effort.
9 In this section, I use the model described 
above to compare the effects of alleviating one or both of these market failures.  I begin by 
summarizing the main results of using an optimal carbon tax, which corrects the environmental 
externality, but does not address knowledge spillovers.  I then consider how the results change 
when R&D subsidies are used to correct the market failures resulting from knowledge spillovers.  
Finally, because the level of emissions reductions resulting from an optimal tax is lower than 
often proposed by policymakers, I also consider whether R&D subsidies affect the desirability of 
more restrictive emissions reduction proposals. 
 
                                                 
8 For this paper, I use the base case assumption of 50% crowding out, as discussed in Popp (2004a,b).  These papers 
show that assumptions about crowding out are important, and explain much of the variation found across climate 
policy models that include induced technological change. 
9 Of course, the implied assumption that the social rate of return on R&D now equals that of other investments 
implies that the government sets subsidy levels at a socially optimal level.  Thus, the results provide an upper bound 
for the potential of R&D subsidies.  Realistically, one would expect political constraints and imperfect information 
to limit the government’s ability to set optimal subsidies.  This strengthens the results that follow, which suggest that 
subsidies by themselves are not nearly as effective as carbon taxes. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  12 
A. Optimal Environmental Policy 
Popp (2004b) presents the results of a simulated optimal carbon tax without R&D 
subsidies.  As is typical of economic models that solve for an optimal climate policy, the results 
recommend that climate policy proceed slowly.  Because carbon emissions stay in the 
atmosphere for a long period of time, the marginal damage from any additional ton of emissions 
is low.  Thus, gradually phasing in carbon reduction lowers the opportunity cost of reducing 
emissions without having much impact on the global climate.  Figure 2 shows the carbon tax for 
the first 100 years.  The tax starts at a value of $10.30 per ton in 2005,
10 and rises to $72.59 by 
2105.  To compare the magnitude of the tax to other policy goals, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) 
calculate a tax of $52.48 per ton to restrict emissions to 1990 levels. 
The emissions reductions resulting from this carbon tax can be found by comparing the 
lines for business as usual (BAU) and optimal tax in Figure 3.  Compared to BAU, carbon 
emissions under an optimal carbon tax fall by just 3.2% in 2005, by 5.4% in 2025, and by 15.4% 
in 2105.  As a result of this, atmospheric temperature continues to rise, although at a slightly 
slower pace, as shown in Figure 4.  Here, and in the figures that follow, solid lines illustrate 
results under BAU, and dashed lines results using an optimal carbon tax only.  Lines marked 
with additional symbols show results from a simulation also including R&D subsidies.  These 
are discussed in subsection B. 
Table 1 and Figures 5 and 6 show R&D spending on energy efficiency and the backstop 
technology (as well as under the R&D subsidy policy to be discussed below).  In the base year 
(1995), there are $10 billion of energy R&D, and $1 billion of backstop energy R&D.
11  Based 
                                                 
10 All monetary figures are presented in 1990 U.S. dollars. 
11 The $10 billion figure for energy R&D represents 2% of all R&D spending by OECD countries in 1995.  The $1 
billion figure for backstop research represents an additional 10 percent of R&D, and comes from data in Anderson 
(1997). R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  13 
on results from Popp (2002), the model is calibrated so that the initial elasticity of energy R&D 
with respect to energy prices is 0.35, and so that the elasticity falls over time due to diminishing 
returns to research, as discussed in section II.  This results in $13 billion of energy efficiency 
R&D in 2005, and $1.37 billion of backstop energy R&D in 2005 under the optimal policy. 
Finally, it is useful to consider the overall economic impact of the carbon tax.  I calculate 
the net economic impact as the present value of consumption with policy minus the present value 
of consumption under BAU.  Simply correcting the environmental externality through an optimal 
carbon tax increases welfare by $2.31 trillion. 
 
B. R&D Subsidies 
The above results correct show the effects of policy designed to correct the 
environmental externality market failure.  However, as discussed in section II, the potential of 
R&D to reduce the costs of complying with climate change is limited by additional market 
failures for R&D.  Because firms cannot fully capture the social benefits of their research, they 
will underinvest in energy (and other) R&D.  The main contribution of this paper is to ask how, 
if at all, the potential of R&D changes when such market failures are corrected.  This section 
evaluates the potential of government R&D subsidies as part of a climate policy scenario. 
Because two market failures, the environmental externality and knowledge spillovers, 
need to be corrected, there are three possible policies to consider.  They differ by addressing 
either one or both of these two market failures.  First, one could imagine a policy that simply 
corrects the knowledge spillover problem, but ignores the environmental externality.  This would 
be equivalent to removing the rate of return constraint in ENTICE-BR, but not implementing a 
carbon tax.  While such a policy corrects for knowledge spillovers, it ignores the environmental R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  14 
benefits that emerge from energy R&D.  Second, the government could use R&D subsidies that 
consider both the social benefits of knowledge spillovers and the environmental benefits 
provided by the R&D.  Such subsidies will, of course, be greater than the subsidies under the 
first policy option.  In this case, the total level of R&D would be equivalent to the R&D under a 
carbon tax with the rate of return constraint removed.
12  Finally, rather than using R&D subsidies 
in isoloation, the government can use subsidies in tandem with an optimal carbon tax.  Such a 
policy would be preferred to either using a carbon tax or subsidies alone, as it addresses both 
market failures.
13 
Table 1 and Figures 5 and 6 show the levels of both types of energy R&D under the 
various policy scenarios.  Table 1 also shows the percentage by which R&D increases from BAU 
under each policy scenario.
14  In the short run, simply implementing an optimal tax increases 
R&D more than correcting R&D market failures.  For example, compared to BAU, backstop 
R&D increases by 7 percent under the carbon tax (which corrects the environmental externality, 
but not the spillover problem), but just 4.7 percent in the BAU scenario with R&D subsidies 
(which corrects the spillover problem, but not the environmental externality).   
However, while the percentage of R&D induced by the carbon tax remains relatively 
constant over time, the percentage increase induced by the subsidy grows.  Each additional R&D 
dollar not only benefits current consumers, but also provides additional building blocks for future 
research.  Thus, as shown in the figures, the major difference in long run R&D comes from 
correcting the spillover problem, rather than the environmental externality.  By the middle of 
                                                 
12 Such a policy is implemented in ENTICE-BR by first solving the model with a carbon tax and no rate of return 
constraint.  I then constrain R&D to the levels found in that run, and re-run the model without a carbon tax.   
13 Note that, unlike Schneider and Goulder (1997), I only consider the effect of correcting the knowledge market 
failures for energy R&D only, rather than broader policies designed to correct market failures in all R&D markets. 
14 In the table, BAU with R&D subsidies represents the first policy discussed above, in which only knowledge 
spillovers are considered.  Optimal tax with R&D subsidies gives the level of R&D under both the second and third 
policies discussed above, in which subsidies address both the environmental externality and knowledge spillovers. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  15 
next century, optimal R&D subsidies increase R&D by as much as 43 percent.  Furthermore, 
after correcting for knowledge spillovers, the additional increment to R&D from also 
acknowledging the environmental externality is small, as shown by the differences between the 
lines labeled BAU with R&D subsidies and optimal tax with R&D subsidies in Figures 5 and 6.  
There is a larger difference between R&D with and without subsidies under BAU (or under an 
optimal tax policy) than there is between R&D with and without a tax when a subsidy is in place.  
Thus, while climate policy will induce some increases in climate-friendly R&D, the most 
significant gains to R&D spending come from directly addressing the market failures resulting 
from knowledge spillovers. 
Nonetheless, note from Figures 3 and 4 that while subsidies do increase energy R&D in 
the long-run, they have little impact on other important variables.  Recall that, in these figures, 
the two solid lines show emissions under BAU and the dashed lines show emissions with the 
optimal carbon tax.  Symbols mark the lines representing policies with R&D subsidies. These 
figures emphasize the importance of environmental policy for reducing emissions.  While there 
is a significant drop in emissions between any BAU scenario versus any carbon tax scenario, 
there is almost no change in emissions under BAU versus BAU with R&D subsidies only.   
Similarly, the addition of R&D subsidies does not lead to further emissions reductions after a 
carbon tax is in place.  Of course, similar trends hold for temperature.   
Moreover, using R&D subsidies leads to virtually no change the optimal level of the 
carbon tax, which remains within one-half of one percent of its original level after subsidies are 
included.  The carbon tax rate is based on the marginal damage of emissions.  The marginal 
damage curve for carbon emissions in any given year is relatively flat, as one additional ton of 
carbon is just a small addition to total concentrations.  While R&D allows emissions reductions R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  16 
to be achieved at lower cost, it does not change the marginal benefits gained from reducing 
emissions, which is the avoided marginal damage.  A tax set at this level is still necessary to 
force consumers and producers to consider the environmental costs of their actions when 
consuming fossil fuels.  While R&D subsidies can augment other environmental policy, and can 
help lower the costs of complying with these policies, they cannot serve as a substitute for 
policies designed to restrict emissions!
15 
As would be expected, with such small impacts on emissions, the effects of R&D 
subsidies on overall economic welfare are also small.  Table 2 shows the welfare gains from four 
separate policies: R&D subsidies only, optimal R&D subsidies only, an optimal tax only, or both 
an optimal tax and optimal R&D subsidies.  Of course, the maximum welfare gain is achieved 
when policy addresses both market failures.  In this case, welfare improves by $2.43 trillion.  As 
shown in the table, most of this increase comes from the carbon tax.  A carbon tax alone achieves 
95% of these welfare gains.  However, R&D subsidies alone achieve just 10% of the maximum 
welfare gain. 
The above results suggest that R&D subsidies can be a useful complement to other 
environmental policies, but do not have the ability to address the climate change problem alone.  
Thus, while policymakers may find it politically expedient to fall back on proposals for increased 
research efforts to confront climate change, significant progress cannot be made without 
complementary policies in place to restrict emissions.  There are two reasons for the limited 
potential of R&D subsidies. Most importantly, R&D subsidies address market failures in the 
invention of new technologies, but do not provide incentives to adopt new technologies.   
Consider, for example, Figure 7, which shows the percentage of energy coming from backstop 
                                                 
15 The result that the carbon tax does not change is consistent of the theoretical predictions of Goulder and Mathai’s 
(2000) benefit-cost model, which compares optimal tax levels with and without policy-induced technological change 
(but ignores knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies). R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  17 
sources.  Compared to BAU, this percentage increases by about five percentage points under a 
carbon tax.  However, there is almost no change in the percentage when comparing BAU with 
and without R&D subsidies.   
A second limitation of R&D subsidies comes from the opportunity costs of R&D.  R&D 
is performed by highly trained scientists and engineers.  Shifting more resources towards one 
type of research results in fewer resources available for other research opportunities.  For 
example, Goolsbee (1998) finds that one of the chief beneficiaries of R&D tax subsidies are 
scientists and engineers, as increased demand for their services leads to higher wages.  Similarly, 
in Popp (2004a), I present evidence that approximately one-half of the energy R&D spending 
that took place in the 1970s and 1980s came at the expense of other R&D.  This lost R&D comes 
at a high cost.  Because of market failures for knowledge, the social returns to R&D are high for 
all types of R&D, not just for energy R&D.  Recall from section II that the consensus from 
studies on the returns to R&D is that the social rates of return are approximately four times 
higher than the rates of return to other investments.  Thus, taking one dollar from other R&D 
projects has the same effect as taking four dollars from other types of investments.  Indeed, the 
socially optimal level of R&D subsidies found by the ENTICE-BR model account for this, as the 
rates of return to R&D remain twice that of other investment even after the constraint requiring 
the returns to be four times higher is removed.
16  If the government ignores these social costs, 
and subsidizes energy R&D until its rate of return is equal to that of other investments, net 
economic welfare actually falls due to the lost value of other R&D. 
 
                                                 
16 The result follows from the combination of the social returns on R&D being four times that of other investments, 
and from the assumption that 50% of new energy R&D comes at the cost of other R&D.  Thus, the total social cost 
of new energy R&D is twice that of other investments. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  18 
C. Other Climate Policies 
By implementing an optimal carbon tax, the above simulation shows the maximum 
possible gains to economic welfare from correcting the market failures concerning emissions and 
R&D.  However, most discussions of climate policy revolve around more restrictive policies that 
set fixed emissions levels.  Thus, I consider the interaction of R&D subsidies with two additional 
policies – one restricting emissions to 1995 levels, and a second mandating at least 10 percent of 
energy come from backstop sources.
17 The policy mandating backstop energy retains a carbon 
tax as well, so that climate policies are in place even after backstop prices fall to a level where a 
government mandate is not needed to encourage 10% market penetration. 
Figure 8 compares atmospheric temperature under the BAU scenario and each of our 
three policy scenarios.  For each policy scenario, results are presented for policies that also 
include R&D subsidies.  As before, these subsidies have little effect on the value of variables 
other than R&D, so that the results without subsidies are similar.  Requiring 10% of total energy 
to come from backstop sources slightly lowers atmospheric temperature in the short run, but has 
little long-term effect.  As shown in Figure 9, which illustrates the percentage of energy coming 
from backstop sources under each policy, the mandate merely speeds up the time it takes for 
backstop market penetration to reach 10%.  Once this occurs, the mandate has no additional 
effect, and usage patterns mirror those of the optimal carbon tax policy.   
In contrast, restricting emissions to 1995 levels lowers atmospheric temperature nearly 
one degree Celsius more than either the optimal tax or backstop mandate policies.  However, this 
drop in temperature comes at a cost.  As shown in Table 2, restricting emissions to 1995 levels 
has a negative impact on net economic welfare – the potential benefits of reduced emissions do 
not justify the costs of reducing emissions quickly.  Recall from Figure 3 that an optimal climate 
                                                 
17 Popp (2004b) includes a discussion of a policy restricting emissions without R&D subsidies. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  19 
policy entails a gradual emissions reduction.  Acting quickly forces short-term reductions before 
technology has had a chance to evolve and lower the costs of action.   
Turning to R&D, note that while R&D subsidies increase both backstop and energy 
efficiency R&D under these alternative polices, the impact of this additional R&D is generally 
negligible.  Figures 10 and 11 show energy efficiency and backstop R&D under each policy 
scenario, both with and without subsidies.  Not surprisingly, the restrictive policy induces the 
most R&D, particularly for backstop energy.  As before, the biggest jumps in R&D come not 
from environmental policy, but from the subsidies themselves.   
Nonetheless, once again R&D subsidies have little impact on emissions or temperature.  
In fact, under the restricted emissions case, there is no change in temperature when R&D 
subsidies are added to the policy, since the climate policy offers no incentives for reductions 
beyond what is initially mandated, even as subsidies improve the quality of technology.   In this 
case, the only benefits from additional R&D come from cost savings.  Faster development of 
new technologies makes meeting a fixed emissions target cheaper.  As a result, the carbon tax 
needed to meet this goal falls by 14 percent in 2005, and by five percent in 2025.  Such results 
are consistent with the predictions of Goulder and Mathai (2000) in the case of a cost-effective 
policy designed to meet a given goal at the least possible cost.   
However, under both the restricted emissions and backstop mandate policies, the benefits 
of these cost savings are small compared to the direct effect of addressing the environmental 
externality through policy.  In each case, R&D subsidies only improve net economic welfare by 
a few percentage points, as shown in Table 2.  Not only do R&D subsidies not effectively 
address the climate change problem on their own, they also have little ability to soften the 
economic costs of more restrictive climate policies. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  20 
IV. Discussion 
This paper examines the potential role that subsidies for climate-friendly R&D may play 
in policy designed to reduce carbon emissions.  Because firms are not fully compensated for the 
social benefits of knowledge spillovers, they perform less R&D than is socially optimal.  R&D 
subsidies, either through direct government funding of R&D or through tax credits for private 
R&D activity, can help raise R&D levels to a socially desirable level.  Indeed, the results show 
that such subsidies do have a significant effect on the long run levels of energy R&D.  Moreover, 
in the long-run subsidies induce more R&D than a carbon tax does. 
However, R&D subsidies cannot serve as a substitute for other climate policies.  While 
R&D levels rise dramatically when subsidies are included in the policy simulations, there is little 
change to other variables.  Most importantly, since the subsidies do not provide incentive to 
adopt new technologies, emissions do not fall unless subsidies are accompanied by a policy to 
address the environmental externality created by carbon emissions, such as a carbon tax.   
Moreover, for policies designed to meet a benefit-cost criterion, using subsidies does not change 
the optimal level of the carbon tax, as the marginal benefits of reduced emissions do not change. 
In contrast, under a cost-effective criterion, designed to meet a fixed emissions target at the least 
possible cost, R&D subsidies lower the tax level needed to achieve the desired emissions 
reductions.  In both cases, while properly targeted R&D subsidies can lower the cost of such 
policies somewhat, as shown by the five percent welfare gain from the policy using both a tax 
and subsidies in section III B, the biggest gains to both welfare and the environment come from 
policies designed to target emissions directly. 
Finally, when setting the level of R&D subsidies, policy makers need to consider the 
opportunity cost of additional R&D.  Because R&D requires highly trained personnel, at least R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  21 
some new energy R&D efforts will come at the expense of other R&D.  Just as spillovers make 
the social returns to energy R&D high, they also make the social returns to other types of R&D 
high.  Thus, some of the large social benefits of additional energy R&D are offset by large 
opportunity costs from giving up other types of R&D spending.  Ignoring the costs of reducing 
these R&D efforts would result in overly generous subsidies for energy R&D, and could have 
negative impacts on the economy as a whole.  
These results have important implications for those on both sides of the policy debate.  
For those who advocate that climate policy should proceed slowly, the limitations of R&D 
suggest that technological change is unlikely to reduce the burden of costly climate policies by 
significant amounts.  On the other hand, the results also offer support for those that argue that 
quick, strict emissions reductions are needed.  For example, the go-slow approach suggested by 
the DICE model is partially a result of assumptions about the potential damages from climate 
emissions (see, for example, Kaufmann 1997).  For those who think the damages are higher, and 
that strict carbon policies are justified, the results show that R&D policy alone cannot substitute 
for high carbon taxes or strict emissions limits if significant emissions reductions are to be 
achieved.  In either case, while R&D subsidies can be useful to lower the cost of any given 
emissions target, they do not eliminate the need for such a target, nor for continued debate over 
the stringency that emissions limits should take. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  22 
References 
Anderson, Dennis (1997), “Renewable Energy Technology and Policy for Development,” 
Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 22, 187-215. 
Bazelon, Coleman and Kent Smetters (1999), “Discounting Inside the Washington Beltway,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(4), 213-228. 
Buonanno, Paolo, Carlo Carraro, and Marzio Galeotti (2003), “Endogenous Induced Technical 
Change and the Costs of Kyoto,” Resource and Energy Economics, 25(1), 11-34. 
Fischer, Carolyn and Richard Newell (2004), “Environmental and Technology Policies for 
Climate Change and Renewable Energy”, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 04-
05. 
Gerlagh, Reyer and Bob van der Zwaan (2003), “Gross World Product and Consumption in a 
Global Warming Model with Endogenous Technological Change,” Resource and Energy 
Economics, 25(1), 35-57. 
Geroski, Paul (1995), “Markets for Technology: Knowledge, Innovation, and Appropriability,” 
ch. 4 in Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Paul 
Stoneman ed., Blackwell Publishers, Oxford UK, 90-131. 
Goolsbee, Austan (1998), “Does government R&D policy mainly benefit scientists and 
engineers?”American Economic Review, 88(2), 299-302. 
Goulder, Lawrence H. and Koshy Mathai (2000), “Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence of 
Induced Technological Change,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
39(1), 1-38. 
Goulder, Lawrence H. and Stephen H. Schneider (1999), “Induced technological change and the 
attractivenes of CO2 emissions abatement,” Resource and Energy Economics, 21, 211-253. 
Grübler, Arnulf and Sabine Messner (1998), “Technological Change and the Timing of 
Mitigation Measures,” Energy Economics, 20(5-6), 495-512. 
Hall, Bronwyn (1996), “The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development,” in 
Technology, R&D, and the Economy, Bruce Smith and Claude Barfield, eds., Brookings, 
140-183. 
Jaffe, Adam B. (1986), “Technological Opportunity and Spillover of R&D: Evidence from 
Firms’ Patents, Profits, and Market Value,” American Economic Review, 76, 984-1001. 
Jones, Charles I. and John C. Williams (1998), “Measuring the Social Return to R&D,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1119-1135. 
Kaufmann, Robert K. (1997), “Assessing the DICE Model: Uncertainty Associated With the 
Emission and Retention of Greenhouse Gases,” Climatic Change, 35(4), 435-448. 
Kverndokk, Snorre, Knut Einar Rosendahl, and Thomas F. Rutherford (2004), “Climate Policies 
and Induced Technological Change: Which to Choose, the Carrot or the Stick?” 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 27(1), 21-41. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  23 
Levin, Richard C., Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. Winter (1987), 
“Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 3, 783-820. 
Manne, Alan S. and Richard G. Richels (2002), “The impact of learning-by-doing on the timing 
and costs of CO2 abatement,” Working Paper 02-8, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Washington, DC. 
Mansfield, Edwin (1996), “Microeconomic Policy and Technological Change,” in Technology 
and Growth: Conference Proceedings, Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little, eds., 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 183-200. 
Mansfield, Edwin (1977), “Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 91, 221-240. 
Messner, Sabine (1997), “Endogenized Technological Learning in an Energy Systems Model,” 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 7(3), 291-313. 
Pakes, Ariel (1985), “On Patents, R&D, and the Stock Market Rate of Return,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 93, 390-409. 
Nordhaus, William D. (2002) “Modeling induced innovation in climate-change policy,” in: 
Arunf Grübler, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, W.D. Nordhaus (Eds.), Technological Change and the 
Environment, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, 182-209. 
Nordhaus, William (1994), Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of the Greenhouse 
Effect, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Nordhaus, William .D. and Joseph Boyer (2000), Warming the World: Economic Models of 
Global Warming, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Popp, David (2004a), “ENTICE: Endogenous Technological Change in the DICE Model of 
Global Warming,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48(1), 742-
768. 
Popp, David (2004b), “ENTICE-BR: The Effects of Backstop Technology R&D on Climate 
Policy Models,” NBER Working Paper #10285. 
Popp, David (2003), “Lessons From Patents: Using Patents to Measure Technological Change in 
Environmental Models,” NBER Working Paper #9978, forthcoming in Ecological 
Economics.  
Popp, David (2002), “Induced innovation and energy prices,” American Economic Review, 92 
(2002) 160-180. 
Schneider, Stephen H. and Lawrence H. Goulder (1997), “Achieving low-cost emissions 
targets,” Nature, 389, 13-14. 
van der Zwaan, Bob C.C., Reyer Gerlagh, Ger Klaassen, and Leo Schrattenholzer (2002), 
“Endogenous technological change in climate change modeling,” Energy Economics, 
24(1), 1-19. 
Wigley, T.M., Richard G. Richels, and James. A. Edmonds (1996), “Economic and 
Environmental Choices in the Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 concentrations,”, Nature, 
379, 240-243. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  24 
Figure 1 – Schematic of the ENTICE-BR Model 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the logic of the ENTICE-BR model.  Capital, labor and energy services are 
combined to produce output, which can be used for consumption, or reinvested into energy R&D 
or other investment.  As described in the text, energy services combines two types of fuels (fossil 
fuels and a non-carbon backstop technology) and energy efficiency technologies.  The use of 
fossil fuels leads to increased atmospheric temperature, which lowers output through a damage 
function. 












Temperature  R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  25 








































 R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  26 




































BAU BAU w/R&D subsidies optimal tax
tax w/R&D subsidies BAU w/Optimal R&D subsidies  
The figure shows annual carbon emissions under both business and usual (BAU) and an optimal 
carbon tax policy.  Note that R&D subsidies, by themselves, result in very small reductions in 
emissions.  This is true in both the BAU and optimal tax simulations.  Policies aimed directly at 
emissions are needed to achieve reductions. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  27 






























































BAU BAU w/R&D subsidies optimal tax
tax & subsidy BAU w/Optimal R&D subsidies  
 
The figure shows how the departure of global mean temperature from 1990 levels, reported in 
degrees Celsius is affected by carbon taxes and/or R&D subsidies.  As with emissions, R&D 
subsidies by themselves have little effect on temperature. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  28 















































BAU BAU w/R&D subsidies optimal tax tax w/R&D subsidy
 
 
The figure shows the level of energy efficiency R&D, in billions of 1990 US dollars.  As can be 
seen by comparing the BAU and optimal tax lines with and without subsidies, policies that 
correct R&D market failures induce more additional R&D than does the carbon tax itself. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  29 















































BAU BAU w/R&D subsidies optimal tax tax w/R&D subsidy
 
The figure shows the level of backstop energy R&D, in billions of 1990 US dollars.  As can be 
seen by comparing the BAU and optimal tax lines with and without subsidies, policies that 
correct R&D market failures induce more additional R&D than does the carbon tax itself. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  30 




































BAU BAU w/R&D subsidies optimal tax tax w/R&D subsidy
 
The figure shows the percentage of energy from backstop sources under BAU or an optimal 
carbon tax.  As with emissions, a policy addressing carbon emissions directly, such as a carbon 
tax, is necessary to increase this percentage.  There is almost no change between BAU and BAU 
with R&D subsidies. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  31 







































































BAU optimal tax 10% backstop mandate 1995 emissions
 
The figure shows the departure of global mean temperature from 1990 levels, reported in degrees 
Celsius, under various policy scenarios.  In each case, both emissions reduction policies and 
R&D subsidies are used.  While the backstop mandate has little effect on long-run atmospheric 
temperature, restricting emissions to 1995 levels reduces long-run temperature by over one 
degree Celsius compared to BAU. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  32 





































BAU optimal tax 10% backstop mandate 1995 emissions
 
 
The figure shows the percentage of energy from backstop sources under various policy scenarios.  
Note that the backstop mandate increases backstop usage in the short-run, but has little long run 
effect. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  33 















































optimal tax tax w/R&D subsidy 10% backstop mandate
10% backstop mandate w/subs 1995 emissions 1995 emissions w/subs
 
 
The figure shows the level of energy efficiency R&D, in billions of 1990 US dollars, under 
various policy scenarios.  Note that the biggest increases come not from more restrictive policies, 
but from R&D subsidies. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  34 


















































optimal tax tax w/R&D subsidy 10% backstop mandate
10% backstop mandate w/subs 1995 emissions 1995 emissions w/subs
 
The figure shows the level of backstop energy R&D, in billions of 1990 US dollars, under 
various policy scenarios. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  35 
Table 1 – Energy R&D Spending Over Time 
 
Energy Efficiency R&D  2005 2025 2055 2105
BAU 13.08 19.67 26.37  37.96
     w/R&D subsidies 13.08 21.69 32.22  49.53
optimal tax  13.28 19.91 26.88  38.89
     w/R&D subsidies  13.41 22.37 33.44  51
      
Backstop R&D  2005 2025 2055 2105
BAU 1.28 1.7 2.27  3.43
     w/R&D subsidies 1.34 1.93 2.93  5.16
optimal tax  1.37 1.83 2.44  3.61
     w/R&D subsidies 1.44 2.12 3.25  5.67
      
Percent Change from BAU       
Energy Efficiency R&D  2005 2025 2055 2105
BAU N/A N/A N/A  N/A
     w/R&D subsidies 0.0% 10.3% 22.2%  30.5%
optimal tax  1.5% 1.2% 1.9%  2.4%
     w/R&D subsidies 2.5% 13.7% 26.8%  34.4%
      
Backstop R&D  2005 2025 2055 2105
BAU N/A N/A N/A  N/A
     w/R&D subsidies 4.7% 13.5% 29.1%  50.4%
optimal tax  7.0% 7.6% 7.5%  5.2%
     w/R&D subsidies 12.5% 24.7% 43.2%  65.3%
 
Table 1 presents levels of energy R&D spending over time, in billions of 1990 US dollars.  BAU 
shows R&D spending under business as usual without any R&D subsidies.  BAU with R&D 
subsidies presents the R&D levels with subsidies that address knowledge spillovers, but not the 
environmental externality.  Optimal tax shows R&D levels under a carbon tax designed to 
correct the environmental externality, but without R&D policy to address knowledge spillovers.  
Optimal tax with R&D subsidies is the level of R&D under policies addressing both the 
environmental and knowledge market failures. R&D Subsidies and Climate Policy  36 
Table 2 – Welfare Gains 







Optimal tax & R&D subsidies    2.43 100% 
Optimal tax only    2.31 95% 
Optimal R&D subsidies only    0.27 11% 
R&D subsidies only    0.23 9% 
Restrict emissions & R&D subsidies    -3.61 -148% 
Restrict emissions to 1995 levels    -3.75 -154% 
Backstop mandate & R&D subsidies    1.68 69% 
Backstop mandate    1.57 64% 
 
Table 2 summarizes the welfare gains under various optimal emissions policies, as well as under 
two alternative policies discussed in subsection C.  Net economic welfare is measured as the 
difference in the present value of consumption between a policy and BAU simulation, and is 
presented in trillions of 1990 US dollars.  The maximum welfare gain comes from a combination 
of optimal carbon taxes and R&D subsidies, as this addresses both market failures.  Note that 
R&D subsidies themselves do not enhance welfare as much as policies that directly deal with the 
environmental externality from carbon emissions. 